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Social media platforms are today one of the primary means of political expression and cam-
paigning. The growing entanglement of politics with the online sphere raises interest in how 
these new types of media shape the social and political reality. While previous research tends 
to focus on Twitter and Facebook, limited works exists on the political influence of YouTube. 
This is even though YouTube is the second-most visited website and provides unique ways of 
engaging users and disseminating political messages through the combination of rich com-
munication functionality with immersive audio-visual media content. Unfortunately, the in-
fluence of social media platforms such as YouTube on politics is difficult to analyse, due to a 
lack of transparency and qualitative data. Independent researchers and the public have limited 
ways to access meaningful statistics about the video service. This article derives a taxonomy 
to classify YouTube’s ways of political influence from a case-study-driven analysis of YouTube 
in the European political landscape. The authors’ taxonomy aligns with traditional theoretical 
concepts from the media effects theory, particularly framing, priming and agenda-setting. A 
brief discussion of the current regulatory landscape in the EU is provided, and gaps are high-
lighted that might need improvement. The authors conclude by considering the question of 
whether YouTube is a political actor.
Keywords: YouTube, social media, online platform, European Union, content moderation, po-
litical content.
Introduction
There are so many major moments that lead up 
to Election Day: debates, caucuses, primaries. But 
the moments that matter most […] happen quietly 
and quickly in micro-moments, when undecided 
voters become decided voters, often by going online.
Google (2016): “How Political Ads and Video 
Content Influence Voter Opinion” 
Contemporary politics relies increasingly on online and social media communica-
tion. The growing entanglement of politics, whether global or local, with the online sphere 
raises interest in how these new types of media shape the social and political reality. Gen-
erally, the question of what role media play in politics has long raised concerns and inter-
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est in the 20th century. Yet, the shifting nature of media from traditional forms (mass media) 
to the social network type (social media) reveals new patterns of the media’s role in politics.
There is a great number of the new-type media that emerged over the last two dec-
ades. Commonly, social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, attract most attention in 
this regard. However, there is one medium of even higher relevance, that has still received 
less attention, despite it being the most widely circulated medium around the world: You-
Tube. It is the world’s most famous video content distributor, started as a service to dis-
tribute videos in 2005. It was quickly acquired by Google the year after and today offers 
sophisticated functionality for people to connect and interact, thereby shifting from sole 
video distribution towards a social media platform.
While YouTube typically refers to itself as content ‘distributor’, there is growing doubt 
about its neutral role. The Cambridge Analytica scandal demonstrated how the mass-
collection of personal data might be used to sway the opinions of the electorate through 
personalised advertising. Since personalised advertising is the core of YouTube’s business 
model, it has been argued that the service must drive user engagement to make a profit, 
regardless of the consequences for society [1]. Many scholars hypothesise that the con-
tent selection of YouTube radicalises online discourse and thereby threatens the politi-
cal debate, democratic culture, and societal cohesion [1–3]. Conclusive evidence remains 
widely absent because of the difficulty in conducting meaningful analyses.
A major challenge in analysing the impact of YouTube is the lack of transparency 
and qualitative data. Independent researchers and the public have limited ways to access 
meaningful statistics about the video service, scrutinise its practices, and hold it to ac-
count. YouTube’s influence on politics and society remains little understood.
To address this gap, we conduct a case-study-driven analysis of YouTube’s political in-
fluence. Our analysis will focus on European politics and the way YouTube is included in 
political and social interactions as a medium and how this might render YouTube a political 
actor. Europe, and the European Union in particular, provide a good example for a multi-
level study of YouTube’s interactions and activities on the national and supranational levels 
and its compliance with regional digital legislation. For more coherence, we first categorise 
the different dimensions in which YouTube may exert political influence and substantiate 
these observations with examples. In doing so, we will apply concepts from media analysis, 
particularly framing, priming and agenda-setting. Then, we relate our findings to the current 
EU framework, and identify potential gaps that might need regulatory attention.
Background
Since its creation in 2005, YouTube has been a video-hosting for user-generated con-
tent. Initially, user-generated videos were perceived as a poor basis for stable income and 
profit [4]. But already in 2007, some observers have noted not only the success of the busi-
ness model but also the increasing influence of YouTube, calling the coming 2008 US Elec-
tion “the YouTube election” [5]. There increasingly emerged a self-identification dilemma 
for YouTube: while being an open video platform for everyone, it also had commercial 
interests and started to enter the political arena. Politicians began to use YouTube as an 
instrument to access a wider public audience. This tendency of the platform’s “politiza-
tion” continued during the EU elections in 2009, when YouTube launched an EU elections 
channel under the name “Questions for Europe” [6].
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In the early 2010s, the first academic articles appeared related to the political dimen-
sion of YouTube [7]. Considering the term “platform” as a framework for YouTube’s self-
identification, some researchers highlighted that the video-content provider becomes one 
of “the curators of public discourse” [7]. Following up, in 2014, L. Ricke published a book 
on the impact of YouTube on U. S. Politics [8]. Motivated by new insights into the ways the 
platform influences social relations, he emphasised that “although primarily situated as 
a commercial enterprise, YouTube has become a pervasive and vital political communica-
tion tool” [8, p. 1].
Indeed, in the same year, YouTube publicly declared itself an “important platform 
where citizens engage with their governments and elected officials” (emphasis added), 
thereby showing that the platform has become an essential tool for political communica-
tion [9]. This self-manifestation as a “platform” signifies the most crucial theoretical ques-
tions of whether YouTube acts as an open, engaging and equally accessible “forum” for 
political communication (without any kinds of manipulation or distortion), or increas-
ingly as a political actor.
The openness of YouTube raised doubts very early on. T. Gillespie noted in 2010 that 
“to the degree that information intermediaries like YouTube claim to be open… the kinds 
of interventions and choices these providers actually do make can be harder to see” [7, 
p. 359]. Indeed, the term “platform” is a discursive trap. It suggests openness and neutral-
ity, which can never exist if content is filtered and ranked, as done in the case of YouTube. 
In 2015, a paper on online campaigning analysed how “traditional and non-traditional” 
actors can spread their messages on YouTube, underlining how YouTube is skewed to-
wards the traditional mass media outlets and struggles to democratise the public debate 
truly [10]. Indeed, the usage of the term “platform” to characterise YouTube indicates that 
there is a lack of “sufficiently precise language for attending to these kinds of interventions 
and their consequences” [7, p. 360] making the idea of YouTube as a platform bounded, if 
not distracting from the core issues. 
Recent studies on social media also reveal “that alongside immediate communica-
tion power (such as networking, networked and network-making power), social media 
also has … ‘systemic opinion power’” [11, p. 846]. Such power means the ability to “cre-
ate dependences and influence other players in a democracy” [11, p. 846]. In the case of 
YouTube, this might lead to the creation of a distorted picture of reality [1], by changing, 
shifting, and radicalising the public discourse on political matters. 
Besides this, another question remains understudied. Insufficient attention is being 
paid “to the growing trend by… YouTube to move into the active role of content edi-
tors“ [11, p. 849]. The matters of content moderation become yet another prerequisite to 
outline the actorness of YouTube. To some extent, the possibility to frame and limit inap-
propriate political content has been manifested in the 2020 guidelines on YouTube’s sup-
port for elections [12]. This, together with the aforementioned incidents of access limita-
tions, has already amplified the concerns of the possible “quasi-governmental“ actorness 
of YouTube [13].
Overall, there emerge two significant issues related to YouTube. First, YouTube pos-
sibly transcended its self-image of a “platform”, having already become a quasi-actor in 
politics. Second, the growing systemic opinion power of platforms — such as YouTube — 
might require new remedies, given the impact on freedom of speech and equal participa-
tion in the democratic process.
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Power and actorness of mass and social media
Both identified issues relating to YouTube raise the question of what political power 
a platform or media can pose. This question has a long history in political and media 
studies, even before media based on an online network logic, i. e. social media, started to 
challenge traditional mass media.
In the early 2000s, political and media studies came to several basic assumptions 
about the political and discursive powers of media, including the abilities of framing, 
priming and agenda-setting [14–17]. The three concepts are highly interrelated. Framing 
is a “process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that 
highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation”. Priming and 
agenda-setting supplement this process by raising “the salience or apparent importance of 
certain ideas” and “defining problems worthy of public and government attention” respec-
tively [18, p. 164]. Through a set of discursive practices, the context of a certain message, 
event or statement can be changed by the media in a certain way corresponding to a par-
ticular agenda. This highlights the potential threat of systemic opinion power.
These abilities of (traditional) media were detected in the context of the mass media 
influence on public and political discourse. In terms of critical discourse analysis, inter-
connections of politics and media resulted in the emergence of mediatised politics which 
“is sometimes seen as the colonization of politics by the media, and sometimes seen as the 
colonization of the media by politics” [19, p. 200]. This premise leads to the understanding 
that in the contemporary context as well as previously “restricting the role of the media to 
their primary function of information dissemination is not only a deficient description of 
the media, but also means distorting and underestimating the legitimate active role of the 
media in the process of opinion formation” [20, p. 183].
Even though the medias’ discursive influence has been recognised, a relevant ques-
tion remains. To what extent are the features of traditional mass media relevant for so-
cial media? Initially, the term “social media” itself was contested (“because it implies that 
traditional media do not encompass a social dimension”) [21, p. 23]. The interactive and 
networking possibilities of social media platforms showed a shifting approach to media. 
As highlighted by U. Klinger and J. Svensson, “network media logic differs from tradi-
tional mass media logic in three different but interrelated dimensions: the production of 
media content, the distribution patterns of information, and the way people use media” 
[21, p. 34].
As for the political sphere, the shift from mass media logic to social media has shown 
limited impact on how political actors use media. Even in contemporary social relations, 
the broadcasting function (and not the networking possibility) “continues to be central 
to political social media practices” [21, p. 24]. The interactive potential of social media is 
used only partly [22; 23]. This shows continuity in the existing practices of media usage by 
political actors. Even if broadcasting remains the essential function of media, the network 
logic of social media has altered and changed the way politically relevant information is 
disseminated and received by the social media users. Already in 2011, Foreign Affairs as-
serted “the political power of social media” [24], showing that social media platforms are 
increasingly becoming active participants and mediators in political (and international) 
relations. This political power can be utilised by social media and other stakeholders in 
different ways (including framing, priming or agenda-setting). However, there is no strict 
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answer to the question of whether the existence of such power shows the presence of ac-
torness.
Answering this question, another researcher on media actorness, B. I. Page, stressed, 
that the “political actor” concept (applied to the media or anyone else) “implies observable 
action that is purposive (though perhaps functional rather than consciously intended) 
and sufficiently unified so that it makes sense to speak of a single actor” [25, p. 20]. In this 
context, there is a need to examine the potential purposive and unified actions of a social 
media, i.e. YouTube, to understand its possibility to be perceived as a political actor. In 
doing so, we will assess potential ways, in which YouTube can perform political actions 
or display political power and to what purpose. To complement this assessment, we will 
examine the possibility to apply the concepts of framing, priming and agenda-setting to 
the actions of the social media.
Types of political influences
YouTube’s prominence in online media gives rise to political influence in many ways. 
Motivated by how traditional mass media spreads certain ideas or beliefs, we propose that 
these ways of influence fall in the case of social media such as YouTube into three distinct 
categories: direct (framing effect), indirect (priming effect), and hybrid (agenda-setting 
effect) ways. The following discusses how each of these three groups act politically, by 
drawing on relevant examples from Europe. While our choice of examples is geographi-
cally restricted, similar ones might be found in other regions.
In our case study, we drew on diverse examples from European politics connected 
to YouTube’s activity beyond its status as a solely economic entity. The selection of the 
examples was based on a qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources, including 
official statements by public and private bodies, as well as newspaper articles. The pre-
sented taxonomy of the types of political influences arose from a systematic comparison 
and thematic analysis of the identified sources. We summarise the results of our case study 
in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of case-study in this document: The ways of YouTube’s political influence fall into 
three distinct categories that align with three major media effects
Direct (framing) Indirect (priming) Hybrid (agenda-setting)
Lobbying (Personalised) Advertising Content Moderation and 
Censorship
Direct Messaging Hyper-Personalisation 
and Platform Design
Hosting of (Political) Content
Self-Marketing
Direct
Direct political influence can be categorised into lobbying, direct massaging and self-
marketing, depending on the audience and the tools used to promote a particular idea or 
interest of YouTube. All of these categories imply to a significant degree the framing effect 
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due to the inherent logic of the promoted message, and allow YouTube to act as a political 
agent, assembling a narrative with a particular interpretation in a unified and purposive 
way. Still, the framing happens not through the dissemination of a textual interpretation 
of particular events while highlighting news, but through the promotion of a causal inter-
pretation or moral evaluation of certain problems [26].
Lobbying
Corporations have long used lobbying to influence policy in their favour, and You-
Tube is no exception. Ample theoretical evidence proves that lobbying can be effective. Fa-
mously, Mançur Olson argued in his 1965 The Logic of Collective Action that small groups 
can often override the interests of large groups — such as the unorganised societal major-
ity — due to the different organisational costs [27]. More recent economic research pro-
vides empirical evidence that indeed “economic elites and organised groups representing 
business interests have substantial independent impacts on U. S. government policy” [28, 
p. 565]. The average YouTube user might be at a disadvantage to the shareholders behind 
the company.
In the EU, in-house lobbying becomes a way to influence certain relevant decisions on 
a multi-level basis. A recent attempt in this regard is the debate around the EU Copyright 
Directive. YouTube CEO Susan Wojcicki directly stressed in an open letter on YouTube’s 
2019 achievements, that she was involved in a dialogue with policymakers. On the local 
level, it included the explanation of the creator economy’s value while “meeting with gov-
ernments and inviting local creators to help explain to legislators how Article 17 (formerly 
known as Article 13) could affect creators” [29]. The attempt to “advocate for responsible 
copyright reform” becomes a frame used by YouTube while lobbying. Still, the framing 
of the debate on EU Copyright Directive shows YouTube’s self-interest, which gives the 
lobbying a purposive nature. The self-interest is connected to the increased liability of the 
platform under the Directive. Yet, direct lobbying was not the only instrument to frame 
the public opinion on Article 17.
Direct messaging
Another way of YouTube’s political influence is the engagement of its own users in the 
political process through direct messaging. This approach is similar to lobbying, but has a 
different audience. While the primary target in lobbying are policy makers, direct messag-
ing aims at individual users to sway their opinion in one way or another. Due to the large 
YouTube user base of more than 2bn monthly active users [3], YouTube is in a special — if 
not unique — position to be able to deliver (political) messages to such a vast number of 
users. It is difficult to perceive how any traditional news company or communication me-
dium could match the reach of YouTube.
In the similar case of the EU Copyright Directive, YouTube tended to frame the us-
ers’ and creators’ opinion to strengthen its lobbying capabilities. In a clear statement on 
the negative implications of the Directive Susan Wojcicki encouraged content creators to 
“tell the world through social media (#SaveYourInternet)… why the creator economy is 
important” [30]. In its appeal to “take action immediately” YouTube started, as charac-
terised by several media, “one of its most aggressive consumer-facing lobbying efforts” 
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[31] to protect the platform’s profitability [32]. In the end, dozens of YouTubers from EU 
countries supported the #SaveYourInternet campaign leading to the improvement of the 
Directive’s final version in 2019.
To our best knowledge, there are no apparent examples of YouTube using direct mes-
saging to promote the political interests of other corporations. However, YouTube engages 
in various collaborations to produce video content, through which the platform necessar-
ily promotes a certain agenda. YouTube might also promote the political interests of other 
organisations indirectly (e. g. through the dissemination of advertising), as we discuss in 
the following sections.
Self-marketing
Self-marketing is another instrument through which YouTube acts as a political 
agent. The company uses public communications, including its blog, policies and website, 
to frame how it is perceived. One of the most well-known examples is the self-character-
isation as a “platform”, which YouTube has long used in public communications [4]. The 
term suggests a neutral role as a content distributor, and indeed, YouTube currently faces 
limited liability for content on its platform under EU and US law because of this role. Yet, 
platforms, such as YouTube, choose what content is seen by its users and distribute con-
tent for a profit. The self-framing as a neutral platform distracts from this role, and does 
not allow for the precision needed to scrutinise the business practices of YouTube [4] and 
its political influence.
During the last years, contradictory examples of YouTube’s self-marketing can be 
found on the blog of the company [33]. Here, YouTube presents itself as an effective — if 
not essential  — way to reach voters in elections. Thereby, the platform puts forward a 
narrative to legitimise new ways of influencing public opinion, notably personalised ads. 
At the same time, more recently, YouTube tried to stress its efforts to become a “reliable 
source for news and information” and an “open platform for healthy political discourse” 
[12]. This dichotomy reveals the inherent contradiction in YouTubes role as a profit-ori-
ented company and as a political actor responsible for equal access to an open social dia-
logue on the platform.
Indirect
There is a range of indirect ways in which YouTube may distort the political agenda. 
The notion of indirect influence includes priming which occurs by emphasising certain 
politically and socially relevant ideas and stressing those arguments that can sway the 
user’s opinion. An example of indirect influence are ad campaigns that “do not promote a 
certain party or candidate, but the subject matter and message would favour certain can-
didates and parties because of their aligned agenda” [34, p. 11]. This brings indirect influ-
ence close to agenda-setting, but, in its nature, it is built on indirect stimulus. Thereby, one 
of the most important aspects of priming is its dependence on the idea’s accessibility in 
the human mind based on the frequency and recency of the user’s exposure to an idea [16]. 
A platform can manipulate both the frequency and recency with which content appears 
in the user newsfeed or recommendations. The main instruments are the advertising and 
personalisation tools ingrained in the design of YouTube.
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(Personalised) Advertising
YouTube acts not only as a platform for videos, but also for ads. Just as for sharing 
videos, almost everyone can deliver political messages on YouTube, by purchasing ad-
vertising on the platform, given they follow the rules and guidelines set by YouTube. By 
allowing for advertising (whether political or not), YouTube determines what opinions 
users are exposed to, and thereby influences public discourse. A similar line of argu-
ments applies, as laid out in the rest of this article. While YouTube commits itself to 
quality checks on the ads with special rules for political ads, YouTube’s moderation of 
ads poses the same tensions around freedom of speech, commercial interests, and the 
health of public discourse as the moderation of video content. YouTube‘s advertising 
moderation (alongside content moderation) constitutes a de facto monopoly in con-
ditioning the distribution of video content on the Internet. It derives from YouTube‘s 
market dominance in video hosting and the absence of transparency measures in the 
moderation process (for example, the decision processes to determine the rules for po-
litical ads are not published).
This problem is also present in the European context. Isabella Adinolfi MEP raised 
the concern that “some YouTube contributors are claiming that their videos have been 
unfairly deprived of the advertising proceeds from the platform” [35] with the EU Com-
mission. This stresses the potential negative outcomes of YouTube’s advertising modera-
tion. Still, the European Commission notes that social media platforms “remain free to 
organise matters such as advertising policies” [36]. Thus, even under the threat of violating 
several fundamental rights, the advertising rules of platforms such as YouTube in the EU 
remain subject to limited judicial safeguards.
Through its ability to impact and define the number and nature of ads, YouTube can 
raise the salience of certain messages and ideas. Even if not used directly or deliberately, 
it could “in practice constitute a violation of the freedom of expression” [35] or lead to an 
intentional or unintentional priming effect. Both consequences originate not only from 
YouTube’s “advertising power” itself but also from the platform design. For example, al-
gorithmic (advertising) moderation — as done on YouTube — is known to struggle to 
understand the true meaning of content, given the current limitations of the underlying 
natural-language processing technology (NLP).
Hyper-personalisation and platform design
YouTube — as other social media — provides a hyper-personalised user experience. 
This hyper-personalisation of YouTube is expressed in many ways, including video recom-
mendations on the landing page and the next-up recommendations, the search function-
ality, and the obligation to create a user account to access certain functionality of YouTube. 
This raises concerns about the design goals of YouTube.
There are doubts about how well the design of YouTube is aligned with the interests 
of its users. More time spent on YouTube means more opportunities for Google to serve 
ads, and potentially increase revenue. Because of this, the service has widely been ac-
cused of luring users into spending ever more time on the platform. For users, more time 
on YouTube might bear negative effects on their well-being (including different kinds of 
social and psychological harms). An emerging body of literature on digital self-control 
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suggests that users often struggle to exert a meaningful choice over their technology use, 
and that platforms — such as YouTube — apply patterns to exploit human psychology for 
their ends [5].
The way, in which YouTube is designed, matters, and it can have negative effects on 
individuals, society and the public discourse. The personalisation of content gives the plat-
form a clear picture of a user’s preferences and information consumption. Provided a ma-
licious intent, such knowledge can give broad opportunities for intentional priming. The 
personalisation mechanism might have the capacity to manage the amount and recency of 
certain content, which can be further used to create an indirect stimulus for certain biases 
in social and political preferences. 
Even if the malicious use of personalisation is an unlikely (but daunting) prospect, 
two pressing issues still arise globally. First, YouTube’s algorithms might radicalise people 
and their opinion due to the algorithm’s potential bias toward inflammatory content (as it 
tempts users to stay longer on the platform) [1; 3; 37]. It has been argued that “YouTube 
monetizes influence for everyone, regardless of how harmful their belief systems are” [38, 
p. 43]. This can be an example of “unintentional” priming through constant suggestions 
of watch time maximising content. The second issue is connected to the recommendation 
algorithm itself. Due to its proprietary nature, the underlying incentive structures remain 
opaque [39]. Given the priming possibilities, there is a clear need for increased algorith-
mic transparency.
Hybrid
There are further ways of YouTube’s influence on elections or political developments 
that classify neither as direct nor indirect ways. Rather, such influence has a hybrid pat-
tern, wherein the platform utilised its intermediary position to define the type of content 
that is visible for users, thus emphasising certain issues over others. This suggests that 
YouTube possesses an agenda-setting capability, which appears in two forms. First, there is 
the moderation and censorship of content, i. e. the ability to define what and how content 
is (or is not) shown on the platform. The second form is the hosting of political content 
itself. Being an intermediary in this context includes the obligations for fair representation 
of the political debate. The exclusion or inclusion from the platform might be of crucial 
importance for the political representation and power balance. Being able to impact the 
political landscape gives YouTube unique levers of influence in politics.
Content moderation and censorship
According to YouTube’s self-description, its global aim is “to give everyone a voice 
and to show them the world” [40]. This hints towards the fundamental problem of en-
suring proportionality in free speech and deciding what world users should see on the 
platform. One of the most pressing problems related to free speech is currently the 
dissemination of different kinds of false information, fake news and hate speech in the 
digital environment. Ample empirical research suggests that false information spreads 
more easily on social networks because of its higher information content compared to 
truthful information [6]. This raises several crucial issues around YouTube. How should 
YouTube act on disinformation and misinformation? Should it be removed, or rather 
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its spread be reduced? These questions become even more difficult as different national 
contexts might lead to different conclusions, yet YouTube operates as a global company.
The scale of harmful content on YouTube has brought the platform in a position, 
where it needs to determine and regulate the (political) agenda of the platform. To fulfil 
this role, YouTube has been assigning ever more human moderators to content modera-
tion, and been improving on their algorithmic content screening through natural lan-
guage processing and machine learning [41]. Despite these efforts, problems with “over 
blocking” (wrongly taking down content, such as satire, remixed, and whistle-blowing 
content), the balancing between freedom of speech and “freedom of reach” [42] (reducing 
the visibility of problematic content, instead of removal), and lack of accountability and 
transparency persist in content moderation. External instruments to balance YouTube’s 
power over content remain widely absent, sparking concerns that the current self-censor-
ship of YouTube might do more harm than good [42].
The way in which YouTube performs the moderation can differ depending on the 
region. For example, fact-checking features for video searches are offered only in certain 
countries of Europe (and the US) [43]. This leads to disproportionate attention of You-
Tube to certain countries, while missing others, and does not live up to the global nature 
of YouTube’s role in the information space.
Beyond that, there are some cases that expose the challenging nature of YouTube 
fulfilling the role of a censor on its platform. One case comes from European politics. A 
French blogger accused YouTube of trying to censor an interview with the ex-President of 
the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker [44]. Allegedly, YouTube threatened her 
further career prospects on the platform if she asked tough questions. Clearly, the extent 
to which YouTube could exert pressure on the blogger remains open. Yet, it reveals the 
potential pressure YouTube can exert on content creators and the political agenda.
An ongoing case is the complaint of the Russian government regarding the blocking 
of several news agencies by YouTube under the pretext of the violation of hosting rules. In 
a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation YouTube’s actions 
were considered as an “act of discrimination against Russian-language media resources” 
and “arbitrary censorship of content” [45]. The conflict revolves around diverging inter-
pretations of free speech and harmful content, having led to widespread outrage of Rus-
sian officials and a draft bill targeting YouTube. This example demonstrates the increasing 
emergence of confrontations between the platform and a state, especially since state and 
media are often interrelated. Such kind of confrontation has a political nature and stresses 
once again several aspects of YouTube’s actorness.
While determining the presence of a media or news agency and exerting thereby the 
agenda-setting function, YouTube acts in a functional (or purposive) way. The functional-
ity is defined by the community guidelines and platform rules, which make its actions also 
unified.
Hosting of (political) content
Lastly, YouTube exerts political influence by hosting videos with political messages on 
its platform [46; 47]. Sometimes, these political messages might be obvious (e.g. in videos 
by politicians), sometimes this might be more subtle (e.g. by video producers conforming 
with certain political ideologies). Most of the content on YouTube is produced without 
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the active oversight of YouTube. However, the design and rules of YouTube, including 
its monetisation model, sets certain incentives for the available content on YouTube. For 
instance, such might favour sensationalism (driving time spent on YouTube) over jour-
nalistic quality (potentially less sensational). Permitting certain kinds of content on its 
platform (as discussed in the previous point) can be seen as a direct way of YouTube’s 
engagement in the political agenda on its platform.
Recent examples from across Europe suggest that YouTube increasingly becomes an 
important tool in political campaigning. Some of this is connected to the usage of You-
Tube as the dominant communication instrument. For instance, the current Ukrainian 
president Volodymyr Zelensky conducted his successful 2019 campaign for office almost 
entirely on YouTube. Other examples include the above-mentioned interview with Jean-
Claude Juncker and an interview of Emmanuel Macron with a young YouTuber ahead of 
the 2019 EU elections. 
One of the most significant examples of YouTube’s political influence is the so-called 
Rezo-case, wherein a German YouTuber produced a video (“Destruction of the CDU”) 
in the run-up to the 2019 European Parliament elections. His video heavily criticised the 
leading German parties, particularly the CDU, the largest German party. By the election 
day, the video had reached more than 10 million views and sparked an unprecedented 
national discussion about the influence of online media on German politics. Ultimately, 
the European elections turned out as a disaster for the governing three-party coalition, 
reaching only 45 % of the total votes, and only 20 % amongst voters aged 18–24 [47].
The connection between the results of the elections in Germany and Rezo’s video are 
still disputed, but this example revealed the potential audience reach and agenda-setting 
capability of the platform in a political context. Even if the video itself did not become a 
central factor in the voters’ decisions, it shifted the public discourse in a politically highly 
intense pre-election period. Even if YouTube is only an intermediary in this situation, it 
possesses a certain actorness due to enable YouTubers to disseminate politically relevant 
information outside of traditional media.
YouTube, a political actor?
All the above-discussed kinds of political influence reveal a complex conflict in the 
perception of YouTube from a political perspective. The tension between YouTube as a 
political platform, that is to say a tool in political communication, conflicts with the re-
curring display of YouTube’s actorness. To understand this conflict, it is essential to recon-
sider the features of an actor’s behaviour, i.e. a unified and purposive nature of its actions.
Diverse examples of direct influence reveal YouTube’s ability to manifest itself as a 
single actor pursuing its interest, e. g. in the context of European copyright regulations. 
While capable of pursuing political interests in a unified way, YouTube cannot be consid-
ered being as unified as traditional mass media. The main reason is the diversity of the 
content creators on YouTube, and the wide range of opinions and interests.
The purposiveness of YouTube’s actions can neither give a straight answer to the ac-
torness dilemma. Intentions and interests of YouTube are driven by financial motives. 
These aim at increasing advertising revenue rather than political power. The significance 
of financial incentives forces YouTube to stay apolitical. However, while “attempting to 
stay apolitical, YouTube consistently makes the political choice not to care about or pro-
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tect vulnerable communities” [48]. Exploitation of the political landscape is a central ex-
ternality of YouTube’s business model.
Those two aspects reveal that the actorness dilemma cannot be unequivocally re-
solved. To solve this dilemma, YouTube needs to be rebalanced towards the company’s 
self-understanding around promoting free speech in the digital age. A first step could be 
the acceptance of political responsibility. As previously done by traditional media, being 
commonly referred to as the Fourth Estate, YouTube and other social media should ac-
knowledge their role in the political landscape. This is even more important than in the 
case of traditional media due to the sheer size of the audience and the resulting power. A 
second option could be the depoliticisation of the platform. There is some evidence that 
the users do not always welcome the political role of the platform [46]. Still, considering 
the commercial interests of YouTube, this would lead to a decrease in profit and, thus, it is 
less likely to be realised. 
A more realistic way to tackle the emerging political actorness of YouTube would be 
regulatory remedies on the national or supranational level, such as the European Union. 
These remedies may be particularly important since there lacks clarity as to how YouTube 
localises its standards and algorithms to a particular country, given the opacity of the al-
gorithmic system.
EU legislation
The most realistic way to govern the political influence by YouTube are regulatory 
remedies imposed by a national or supranational authority. With the EU being one of the 
largest and most active regulators of digital technologies and social media, this section 
considers how the political power of the platform could be governed within the existing 
legislative framework of the EU. We summarise our analysis of the EU regulatory land-
scape in Table 2.
Table 2. Summary of our analysis of the EU regulatory landscape: Existing legislative framework 
in the EU and limitations concerning the regulation of the political power of YouTube
Legislative framework Foundation Problem
Media law Article 151 TEFU on the protection of 
cultural diversity.
Most media law regarding social stems 
from EU member states.
Data protection law Article 16 TFEU on the protection of 
personal data. General Data Protec-
tion Regulation (GDPR) is main piece 
of legislation.
Limited enforcement and strong focus 
on individuals, less on media.
Competition law Articles 101  and 102  TFEU ensuring 
fair competition.
Current competition practices put li- 
mited focus on data-related issues.
One of the most obvious approaches to tackle the power of YouTube might be to tight-
en EU media law, as suggested by Natali Helberger [11]. While the European Union was 
founded as a foremost economic project, it has over time developed beyond that, towards 
an emphasis of media plurality as one of its pillars. This is enshrined in Art. 151 TEFU 
(Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), protecting cultural diversity in the 
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EU. However, most media regulation remains in the hands of the EU member states, not 
the EU. Examples are the NetzDG and the Medienstaatsvertrag in Germany, proposing 
methods to decrease harmful content on online platforms while increasing proportional-
ity of opinions. The current fragmented approach might not be enough, and media law 
needs to be evolved into targeting digital services.
Fragmentation around the regulation of data amongst the EU member states led to 
the introduction of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018. The law 
combines tight rules on the use of personal data, i. e. data relating to individuals, with high 
fines of up to 4 % of global annual turnover. YouTube’s hyper-personalisation, particularly 
of advertising, would not be possible without the use of personal data. Despite the strict 
rules, enforcement remains the bottleneck of the legislation [49]. Data protection regula-
tors with limited funding are tasked with taking on multi-billion-dollar companies. In-
deed, problems around data are often not only issues of individuals — as governed by the 
GDPR — but problems for society at large. The GDPR was not designed to find solutions 
to these bigger questions, and the regulation of YouTube’s political power might not lie 
within the realm of data protection regulators.
The area of competition law has been struggling with similar problems around en-
forcement. Corporate power and the abuse thereof are governed by Articles 101  and 
102 TFEU. Competition authorities are tasked with enforcing these provisions, includ-
ing overseeing mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Despite this, Google has been able to 
expand its access to data and influence over the digital ecosystem by hundreds of M&A 
transactions, none of which have been stopped [49; 50]. Arguably, the acquisition of You-
Tube itself in 2007 was the first of such “data mergers”, followed by Admob, DoubleClick, 
Crashlytics, and hundreds of other companies. Despite this increasing influence over data 
and the digital ecosystem, competition authorities have argued that the increased access 
to data does not pose a threat to competition, and that M&A transactions can go ahead.
To date, no designated EU regulation for social media companies, such as YouTube, 
exists. Instead, there are many different pieces of legislation, none of which aims at the 
political power of YouTube. Regulatory authorities do currently not have effective means 
to counterbalance the ongoing concentration of political power in the hands of YouTube. 
Despite this, there is a strong obligation for the European Union to protect equality in the 
democratic process: “In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equal-
ity of its citizens.” (Article 9 Treaty on European Union.) This equality might be at stake. 
The European Union has realised the need to rebalance the digital ecosystem, emphasised 
by its Digital Single Market Strategy since 2015 and the upcoming EU Digital Services 
and Markets Acts. The pressure is high to find and implement appropriate remedies soon.
Conclusions
The present article has analysed the manifold ways, in which YouTube influences 
the political agenda. The platform does so in 1) direct ways, through communicating its 
views to policy makers, users and the general public, 2) indirect ways, through strong 
personalisation of the user interface, particularly personalised advertising, and 3) hy-
brid ways through the nature of YouTube itself as a video sharing platform that is in-
creasingly used for political expression, with both positive and negatives impacts on the 
democratic society.
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Because of these various ways of political influence, YouTube acts sometimes as a po-
litical actor. While YouTube may not aim to change the political agenda, its current design 
often inadvertently does. This can put great power into the hands of a small, unelected 
group of circles behind the company. Current EU legislation struggles to provide effec-
tive remedies against this increasing political power of YouTube. The UK Competition 
and Markets Authority suggested putting the oversight of social media into the hands of 
a super regulator, which might be a role model for the EU [51]. The strong alignment of 
YouTube with financial incentives underlines the potential effectiveness of regulation: if 
the incentives are shaped adequately, YouTube will adapt. In the meantime, there will be 
limited need for YouTube to rethink its business model.
This article has shown that much of the power imbalance arises from the design of 
YouTube. The platform exposes users to political content, political ads, and a range of pos-
sible distractions. If users were offered a meaningful choice to overcome these potential 
harms, this might already be enough to fix the most acute issues around YouTube. For 
instance, options might be reducing the personalisation of the user experience by default, 
reducing the visibility of political content and ads, or democratising some of the decision 
processes behind YouTube, e. g. through petition platforms to which YouTube must react 
once a certain threshold of support from users is reached. It should be easy to implement 
such changes and could bring great benefits to users and society more generally. Yet, any 
lasting change will require the engagement of all relevant stakeholders. While regulation 
might be one of many ways to initiate such a process, the will of the users will be essential.
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